Philosophical Reflections on Abortion, the Value of Life, and Bill No. 1904/2024

Abstract

This article examines abortion from a philosophical and bioethical perspective, considering the foundations of the value attributed to human life and the limits of state power over women’s bodies. Methodologically, it adopts a qualitative, bibliographic, and documentary approach, combining a critical analysis of Bill No. 1904/2024 with contributions from embryology, ethics, and feminist philosophy. The bill proposes applying the penalties for simple homicide to abortions performed after 22 weeks, when fetal viability is presumed, and restricting the exclusion of punishment in pregnancies resulting from rape. The article challenges the idea that the value of life is an exclusively biological given and argues that its attribution involves moral, historical, and political dimensions. The discussion distinguishes embryo from fetus to show that the definition of morally relevant human life cannot be reduced to physiological data: it also depends on concepts of personhood, autonomy, recognition, and power. It argues that imposing an absolute value on biological life may translate a particular moral conception into legal rationality and that the defense of human dignity requires the recognition of bodily autonomy as a fundamental ethical principle. It concludes that Bill No. 1904/2024 reinforces mechanisms of control over women’s bodies and reproductive freedom, highlighting the urgency of an ethics of reproductive justice that combines freedom, responsibility, and recognition of the other as a moral subject.