Bergson

under the shadow of the self and the limits of the sayable

Abstract

This article investigates the relationship between Henri Bergson's philosophy and the limits of language in the expression and constitution of the self. The discussion, starting from Bergson, centers on the distinction between the superficial self, manifested through spatialized language and the association of ideas; and the deep self, the qualitative continuity of duration, that is, the real time, that eludes static representation. Engaging with the positions of philosophers such as Sellars, Ryle, and Wittgenstein, we present a traditional conception that associates the mind with language, highlighting the ontological error identified by Bergson in reducing the complexity of states of consciousness to mere semantic constructions. Subsequently, we observe that language, while indispensable for communication and the organization of thought, limits the apprehension of inner reality, as it only captures a surface layer of the mental flow. Thus, Bergson argues that consciousness requires an intuitive approach that transcends the confines of the sayable, enabling a direct experience of the self’s continuity.