Horizon and Noema

Toward a Phenomenological Perspectivism (Part two)

Abstract

The aim is to establish a phenomenological perspectivism in a strong sense, according to which the notion of perspective functions as both a necessary and sufficient condition for appearance. This will be achieved through a critical dialogue with tradition and developing a new theoretical framework, which was opened in the last years. Firstly, by revisiting the theory of donation through profiles (Husserl) and subsequently critiquing the relationship between profile and thing as founded and dependent on a foundational notion of “perspective”. We will show that it no longer functions as part of a whole (pars pro toto), but as a total part (pars totalis). Secondly, by reconstructing the concept of noema, along with the debate it engenders–Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty against the so-called “Fregean” readings of the notion – and subsequently deconstructing its invariant “core” that would reunite perspectives. If the thing is also a “perspective”, perspectives must be linked differently, through their “margins” and not through the “center” of what appears. In this lateral and perspectivist intentionality based on the notion of “horizontality”, outlined at the end of this project, the horizon can be understood as total: phenomena do not “have” horizons, but “are” horizons. These two steps will allow us to move from the rehabilitation of i) perspective to ii) perspectivism from a phenomenological standpoint. Finally, we interrogate the “subjectivity” implied in this theory, which makes perspective “lived” and distinct from versions where the subject's position is derived from an unconscious, drive-oriented, or affective dynamic of perspective (especially against the perspectivism advocated by Deleuze).