The inseparability between subjectivity and objectivity in Sartre

Abstract

The aim of this essay is to demonstrate that phenomenological ontology distinguishes Jean-Paul Sartre from both classical realism and idealism. While both types of beings appear together in appearance, Sartre's method points to a distinction between being-in-itself and being-for-itself. Although beings are separated on the ontological plane, phenomenologically, their unity becomes apparent. In view of this factual confluence between these two beings, the preeminence of existence on the part of being-in-itself and the preeminence of signification on the part of being-for-itself are established. Thus, it is also necessary to show that, in the intricate relationship between objectivity and subjectivity, being-for-itself, by virtue of its ability to bestow meaning on ontic reality, is not confined to its facticity and is capable of transcending it, even though it finds itself in inescapable situations that are not desired by it.