THREATS TO DEMOCRACY UNDER THE JUSCELINO KUBITSCHEK ADMINISTRATION (1955-1960)

Abstract

The administration of Juscelino Kubitschek (JK) is remembered as a period of euphoria, marked by developmentalism, the construction of Brasília, and the expansion of Brazilian industrialization, underpinned by the slogan “50 years in 5.” The constant political and armed conflicts of the 1930–1954 period, in which Getúlio Vargas was the central figure (from the 1930 Revolution to his suicide in 1954), appeared to subside with the election of a civilian president. However, the simulacrum of Brazilian democracy during this period faced a constant siege from civilian and military sectors that refused to accept the PSD-PTB coalition and the political legacy of Vargas, expressed in JK's victory—especially since it was accompanied by Vice President João Goulart (Jango). The first threat occurred even before the inauguration: the UDN (National Democratic Union) and military sectors attempted to prevent JK from taking office, claiming he had not obtained an absolute majority of the votes. The inauguration was secured through the intervention of Marshal Henrique Lott, the Minister of War, who led the Movement of November 11 (1955). This was a preventive counter-coup to remove acting president Carlos Luz, who was conspiring against the inauguration of the elected candidates, replacing him with Nereu Ramos. Throughout the administration, the UDN, under the inflamed leadership of Carlos Lacerda, acted systematically to destabilize JK. The party utilized allegations of corruption in the construction of Brasília and criticism of rising inflation to incite public opinion and the Armed Forces, creating a climate of permanent crisis that tested the limits of democratic institutions. Coup tensions materialized in two armed insurrections led by Air Force officers linked to the opposition: the Jacareacanga Revolt (1956) and the Aragarças Revolt (1959). JK opted to grant amnesty to the rebels in both cases. Although criticized by some as a sign of weakness, this strategy avoided the creation of martyrs and the definitive radicalization of the barracks, allowing him to complete his term—a rare feat in the Brazilian Republic. However, this did not prevent the coup-mongering zeal from remaining alight.