The (De)centralization of the Ego in Michel Henry's Phenomenology of Life

From Transcendental Birth to Constitution

Abstract

This paper seeks to elucidate the constitution of the transcendental ego in Michel Henry's Phenomenology of Life (1922-2002). Initially, we will briefly present the constitution of meaning from the transcendental ego as proposed by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). Next, we will discuss the problem of this transcendental ego, since, for Henry, Husserlian phenomenology leaves the region of being of the ego itself obscure. Henry argues that the transcendental ego does not constitute itself; it is secondary to what constitutes it. What precedes and makes possible the transcendental ego itself is the region of being that Michel Henry calls Life. In this way, the ego does not constitute itself, but it arises passively from this ontological region from transcendental birth. Since this Life is the foundation, it is the ontological condition that makes all manifestation possible. For this study, the works L'Essence de la manifestation (2011), Phénoménologie de la vie: Tome I, De la phénoménologie (2003), and Phénoménologie de la vie: Tome III, de l'art et du politique (2003) will be used. It is therefore necessary to understand how radicalization operates in Michel Henry's Phenomenology of Life in order to reach the meaning of the foundation that constitutes the transcendental ego, identified as the ontological region of Life.