

SEÇÃO: Dossiê Metafísica E Semântica Da Ficção

TRUTHMAKERS FOR NEGATIVE EXISTENTIALS: A NEO-MEINONGIAN APPROACH

VERITADORES PARA EXISTENCIAIS NEGATIVOS: Uma Abordagem Neo-Meinongiana

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Abstract: The purpose of this article is to present a neo-Meinongian solution to the Truthmaking Problem of Negative Existentials. In other words, I attempt to offer what I presume to be the best Meinongian solution to the problem of answering what kind of object can make negative existentials true. Still, before offering this solution, this paper articulates the relationship between this truthmaking problem and the metaontological paradox of negative existentials.

Key words: Meinong; Truthmaking; Metaontology.

Resumo: O objetivo deste artigo é apresentar uma solução neo-Meinongiana para o Problema dos Veritadores para Existenciais Negativos. Em outras palavras, tento oferecer o que presumo ser a melhor solução Meinongiana para o problema de responder que tipo de objeto pode tornar existenciais negativos verdadeiros. Não obstante, antes de oferecer essa solução, este artigo articula a relação entre esse problema de veritação e o paradoxo metaontológico dos existenciais negativos.

Palavras-chave: Meinong; Veritadores; Metaontologia.

1. The Metaontological Paradox and the Truthmaking Problem

Two philosophical puzzles will guide this article. The first one is the so-called Paradox of Negative Existentials – also known as the paradox of nonbeing or Plato's Beard, in reference to the problems of non-being discussed in Plato's Sophist. This ancient riddle arises when we try to deny the existence of something by precisely referring to it (as if it had being in some sense). As Quine (1948) once expressed, “nonbeing must in some sense be, otherwise what is it that there is not?” (p.21).

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Take “Raskolnikov² does not exist” as an example. An intuitive condition for that statement to express a true proposition is that Raskolnikov, the very fictional character, must be such that it does not exist. But if there is something referred to by the term “Raskolnikov”, then it cannot be true that Raskolnikov does not exist. Thus, given the apparent truth conditions of expressions such as “Raskolnikov does not exist”, these statements can only express true propositions when they are not true: hence the paradox!

A precise formulation of the paradox, due to Berto (2012), can be stated as follows:

P1. To deny the existence of something, one refers to that thing;

P2. But if one refers to something, then that thing has to exist;

Thus,

C1. To deny the existence of something, that thing has to exist.

There are two ways of solving the paradox: rejecting P1 and assuming that we can deny the existence of an object without referring specifically to it (the Russellian/Quinean answer); and rejecting P2, by separating quantification and ontological commitment (the Meinongian path). In the next section, we will discuss these solutions and how they are related to metaontology.

Independent of how one chooses to solve the paradox, a related philosophical riddle is finding the appropriate truthmaker for negative existentials (this is the second puzzle I mentioned). In other words, even if we accept that it is true that certain objects do not exist, we still must answer what makes it true that these objects do not exist. We may call this riddle “The Truthmaking Problem of Negative Existentials”. Discussing this truthmaking problem more broadly will be the focus of sections 4 and 5.

² The main character of Dostoevsky’s *Crime and Punishment* (1866).

In the first moment, one can deal with the truthmaking problem in either of two ways: (1) accepting that negative existentials have truthmakers and suggesting one, or (2) denying that anything bears a truthmaking relation to a negative existential. Most philosophers endorsing (1) are metaontologically Quineans, in a broad sense of the term, or simply Parmenideans. The aim of this article, developed in section 5, is to present a neo-Meinongian solution to the Truthmaking Problem of Negative Existentials.

Finally, I devote the last section of this article to some brief commentaries and to reflect on the lessons we may learn from this discussion.

2. The Quinean Way

Solving the Paradox of Negative Existentials requires taking a stand on metaontological issues. Roughly speaking, metaontology can be understood as the branch of metametaphysics focused on foundational and methodological problems regarding ontology (a sub-area of metaphysics)³. While ontology tries to figure out which entities compose reality – or, in a Quinean fashion, which objects are included in the catalog of the world's furniture –, metaontology investigates what the most basic principles of ontology are, which methods are more appropriate for doing ontology and, according to Van Inwagen (1998), it examines what we are asking when we ask “What is there?”.

For a metaontology to be Quinean, it must accept a certain methodology: we shall be ontologically committed to all and only those entities we can find in the domain of quantification of our best sciences formalized in first-order classical logic. On principle, there are no nonexistent objects: if we are really able to refer to a certain object *b*, then *b* has to exist – in other words, “everything” must be the answer to the question “What is there?”⁴ (Call this the Parmedian Principle.)⁵ Thus, if “object” must be used as an ontologically neutral term, then for Quineans all objects are entities (exist).

³ The taxonomy I propose classifies ontology as a branch of metaphysics and metaontology as a branch of metametaphysics. However, there is no unanimity on how to distinguish all these fields, what the precise definition of terms such as “metaphysics” or “ontology” is, and what the relationship between these supposedly different domains of investigation is. See Berto & Plebani (2015) for a discussion on this subject.

⁴ See Quine (1948).

⁵ In reference to the metaphysical theses presented by the great ancient philosopher Parmenides in his poem *On Nature*. See Burnet (1982).

The Quinean answer to the paradox of negative existentials (denying P1) is absolutely Russellian in spirit. He uses Russell's Theory of Descriptions⁶ as a method to eliminate quantification over nonexistent objects and develops further Russell's idea of expanding his method to proper names.

When it comes to statements such as "Pegasus does not exist" – Russell's famous example –, Quine suggests two different paraphrases of the term "Pegasus" for us to be able to apply the Russellian method. The first was already suggested by Russell: we can understand "Pegasus" as an abbreviation of a definite description like "the winged Horse that was captured by Bellerophon". The second Quinean suggestion is that we appeal to an unanalyzable and irreducible attribute (predicate) that could work as a surrogate for the name. In the case of Pegasus, for example, we can appeal to the (plausibly) artificial attribute of *being-Pegasus*. Thus, "Pegasus does not exist" becomes "The thing that *is Pegasus* does not exist" or "The thing that *pegasizes*⁷ does not exist". Once again, the paraphrases enable us to apply the Russellian method and verify the truth of the analyzed statement.

"The thing that is Pegasus does not exist" is analyzed in the following way:

(In conjunction, it is NOT the case that)

- 1) At least one thing is Pegasus.
- 2) At most one thing is Pegasus.
- 3) Whoever is Pegasus exists.

Given that it is false that at least one thing is Pegasus, Quine would conclude that the statement analyzed is true while making no reference to supposedly nonexistent objects.

3. The Meinongian way

⁶ See Russell (1905).

⁷ Quine also suggests this odd and artificial verb as an alternative for us to represent the attribute of being Pegasus.

Meinongians take a completely different route to answer that very same Paradox. To explain it, we must take a step back and discuss what Meinongianism is all about. Ultimately, a Meinongian philosopher is a theorist who accepts the possibility of quantification over nonexistents – that certain objects do not have the property of existing (and thus, that existence is a property). Notwithstanding, this view (in its purest form) does not entail any thesis determining which objects *do* exist (or instantiate the *existence* property) or which objects we are epistemically justified in assuming as part of the world's furniture (a criterion for ontological commitment).

By refusing P2, Meinongians understand that the most general domain of quantification we can linguistically use includes nonexistent objects and, therefore, that we can refer to things that do not exist: not everything exists, and reference is not tied to ontology but is a relation between representational tokens and objects more broadly speaking (including non-beings).

There are three major neo-Meinongian trends and, consequently, three different neo-Meinongian ways to answer the Paradox of Negative Existentials (albeit all three are very similar from the structural point of view). These trends arose as a response to Russell's triviality objection against the initial Meinongian Theory of Objects.

Alexius Meinong has sometimes been interpreted as having advocated the so-called Unrestricted Comprehension Principle – analogous to the one found in Naive Set Theory. This principle would state the following:

(UCP) For any condition Ax , x being a free variable, some object satisfies Ax .

Russell's Triviality Objection⁸ points out that by the Unrestricted Comprehension Principle, it is possible to prove the existence of any object, simply by accepting that existence is a property – as Meinongians do. The Objection is as follows: if for every conjunction of properties, there is an object exemplifying it, then there must be an object exemplifying *being-an-existent-dragon* or *being-the-existent-Santa-Claus*. However, neither dragons nor Santa Claus exist! That is, the principle ends up deriving the existence of any object we imagine, undermining Meinongianism in its most naive form.

⁸ For more information concerning the debate between Russell and Meinong, see Swanson (2011).

Making minor adjustments to Meinong's initial theory, these three forms of neo-Meinongianism escape the threat of trivialization by imposing some sort of restriction or qualification on their Comprehension Principles.

First, there is the Nuclear Meinongianism, endorsed by philosophers such as Sylvan (1980), Jacquette (1996), and Parsons (1980). These philosophers draw a distinction between nuclear and extranuclear properties, arguing that the correct Comprehension Principle only applies to nuclear properties. Nuclear properties must be understood as ordinary properties such as *being-blue*, *being-tall*, and *being-a-mountain*, and extra-nuclear properties are ontological, modal, intentional, and technical properties such as *being-existent*, *being-possible*, *being-thought-about*, and *being-complete*. Since these philosophers considered *existence* an extra-nuclear property, Russell's Triviality Objection is avoided.

Double-Copula Meinongianism, on the other hand, advocated primarily by Edward Zalta (1988), holds that there are two kinds of predication, so that while nonexistent, or abstract, objects can *encode* properties like *being-red* or *being-round* – that is, they are determined by those properties –, existing concrete objects can *exemplify* redness or roundness – instantiating those properties in the more usual sense. Given that Dual-Copula's Comprehension principle only establishes that, for every condition, there is an abstract object encoding the properties satisfying the condition, Russell's objection is once again evaded.

Finally, Graham Priest's Noneism (2005), or Berto's Modal Meinongianism (2012), are theories that understand the distinction between existent and nonexistent objects in terms of possible and impossible worlds. For these authors, as Reicher (2019) points out, the entire modal space shares a common domain of discourse. A nonexistent object in the present world is ultimately an object satisfying the properties that characterize it in some other possible or impossible world. Thus, the existent dragon and the existent Santa Claus are not existent objects in the actual world, but they do exist in other worlds of modal space (and Russell's objection is therefore avoided).

Back to the theme of negative existentials, each form of neo-Meinongianism offers a different solution to the Paradox: Nuclear Meinongians say that denying the existence of an object *O* is only attributing the extranuclear property of nonexistence to it; Dual-Copula Meinongians say that the referred object *exemplifies* the property of nonexistence (even if it does not encode it, given that Pegasus is not nonexistent according to its mythology); and

Modal Meinongians say that, in the actual world, names such as “Pegasus” refer to an object that has the property of being-nonexistent, such that <Pegasus does not exist> is true in the actual world, even if false in the worlds that realize Pegasus’s story (worlds in which Pegasus not only exists but is the winged Horse captured by Bellerophon). Common to all these solutions is the denial of P2 and the acceptance of P1.

4. Parmenidean Truthmaking for Negative Existential

By the expression “Parmenidean truthmaking”, I am talking about those truthmaking theories that accept, consciously or not, the Parmenidean Principle.⁹ Once assuming this principle is one of the main aspects of metaontological neo-Quineanism, we could also talk about neo-Quinean truthmaking¹⁰. Accordingly, which objects could a neo-Quinean choose to solve the problem of truthmakers for negative existentials? We can say that there are at least four strong candidates: absences, totality facts, the world itself, and negative facts¹¹.

The first option has been recently endorsed by Kukso (2006). According to his approach, “Pegasus does not exist” expresses something true by virtue of the absence of winged horses in the world (more precisely, by the absence of the state of affairs *Pegasus existing*). Absences, says Kukso, are mind-independent, causally relevant, and spatiotemporally located objects, fitting perfectly into a naturalistic metaphysical framework.

Totality facts, in turn, are the entities preferred by Armstrong (2004) to solve the truthmaking problem. For Armstrong, positive truths, such as <the sky is blue>, are made true by states of affairs, like *the sky being blue*, which are reduced to non-mereological compositions of a particular and a universal. In Armstrong’s perspective, states of affairs must be non-mereological compositions, for the mere existence of a certain particular and universal does not guarantee that there is a state of affairs representing the instantiation of this universal by that particular. From the mere existence of the Eiffel Tower and the property of *being-made-of-chocolate*, for example, we cannot infer that there is the state of affairs *the Eiffel Tower being made of chocolate* (in fact, for a sane Quinean, there is not).

⁹ See p. 4.

¹⁰ Even if the proponents of those theories would not consider themselves Quineans *tout court*, their theories at least seem compatible with the Quinean meatontology

¹¹ Other alternatives can be found in Jago (2013) and Dodd (2007).

In the case of negative existentials, Armstrong proposes that totality facts are their truthmakers. These so-called “totality facts” are the mereological composition of all first-order states of affairs and the property of *being-a-first-order-state-of-affairs*, under a relation – call it “Total” – establishing that these states of affairs are all the entities instantiating the property of being a state of affairs.

Cameron (2008), in turn, proposes that the world itself can be considered the truthmaker of all negative existentials. On his account, each possible world is essentially the way it is, and their existence necessitates all the propositions that are true according to them, including true negative existentials. Thus, it is true that Pegasus does not exist, according to Cameron's approach, by virtue of the way the world itself is – our actual world is its truthmaker.

Finally, there is a position that would be better described as Russellian than as Quinean. In the same spirit as some of Russell's ideas from the period of *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism* (1918), Jago (2013) proposes that negative existentials are made true by negative facts. Thereby, “the present King of France” does not exist because *there is no King of France*. This fact, in turn, can be understood as the negative non-mereological composition of the property of *being-King-of-France* and the higher-order property of *being-instantiated*.

It is important to note that for Jago's approach to work, the composition containing these two properties must also be non-mereological. That is a consequence of the fact that the mere existence of the universals in question does not guarantee the corresponding fact. For instance, even if the first-order universal *redness* and the second-order universal *color* exist, there is no negative fact expressed by “redness is not a color”.

Nevertheless, these four solutions to the problem of truthmakers for negative existentials are not immune to criticism. Few philosophers are willing to accept absences in their ontologies and primitive negative facts; totality facts are incompatible with Humean metaphysical principles and the world itself “is a severely non-discriminating truthmaker” (Jago, 2013, p.466), being able to work as a truthmaker to every single truth – just to cite a few objections.

Besides that, many philosophers are not comfortable with the primitive relation of non-mereological composition that Armstrong and Jago must accept – after all, what is a non-mereological composition, if composition is precisely what mereology is all about? As we will see, two of the three Meinongian solutions I propose to solve the truthmaking problem have

the advantage of dispensing non-mereological composition even if following some Armstrongian intuitions.

5. Meinongian truthmaking for negative existentials

Neo-Meinongians rarely discuss truthmaking. Thus, there are no standard neo-Meinongian positions regarding the problem of truthmakers for negative existentials. Nevertheless, I assume that the default position concerning this truthmaking problem is denying Truthmaking Maximalism and, therefore, accepting that certain truths have no truthmakers – particularly true negative existentials.

Supporters of this view may lay on Asay's ontology-first truthmaking perspective, according to which "negative existentials impose negative constraints on our ontology" (Asay, 2018, p.16), but commit us ontologically with no particular entities. The role of truthmaking theory, as claimed by Asay, would be simply to guide ontology, so that we ontologically commit ourselves to everything required by the body of truths we believe in. Thus, given that <Santa Claus does not exist> commits us to no particular entity, <Santa Claus does not exist> has no truthmakers.

I do not think that the ontology-first position works for those endorsing neo-Meinongian metaontology. If you are a Meinongian, you already accept somehow infinite objects in the overall domain of quantification. Hence, you cannot use truthmaking theory to help you answer what there is – you already admitted that *everything* (existent or not) is there. In other words, if you are Meinongian, you are committed to all possible and impossible objects, even if you do not know, pre-theoretically, which ones of those instantiate the property of existence. Truthmaking theory, however, will not help you with that.

Thus, inspired by Armstrong's approach to truthmaking, I suggest a solution that all three forms of neo-Meinongianism (with appropriate adjustments) can accept to answer positively the truthmaking problem of negative existentials. Roughly, I propose that all true negative existentials are true by virtue of an existent state of affairs mereologically composed of a nonexistent object plus the property of nonexistence.¹²

¹² There is a Fregean objection against the possibility of defining states of affairs in mereological terms. Assuming the transitivity of *part-of*, if *Vesuvius's being a volcano* has Vesuvius as a part, and Vesuvius has solidified lava as a part, then *Vesuvius's being a volcano* should have solidified lava as a part, which is supposedly absurd (see Textor, 2021). There are at least three different ways to deal with this objection: (i) one might bite the bullet and

On a Nuclear Meinongian framework, a negative existential can be made true by the mereological composition of an object plus the extra-nuclear property of *nonexistence* (a state of affairs composed of a nonexistent object instantiating an extra-nuclear property). For Modal Meinongians, I suggest that the truthmaker for a negative existential such as “Raskolnikov does not exist” could be the actually existent state of affairs mereologically composed of the object Raskolnikov plus the non-existence-entailing property of *being-nonexistent*.

For Dual-Copula theorists, however, things get more complicated. Given that this trend of Meinongianism accepts two modes of instantiation, we will have to assume two different forms of mereological composition¹³ between particulars and properties – what I will call “exemplifying composition” and “encoding composition”. Thus, negative existentials are made true, according to this approach, by exemplifying composition between a nonexistent object and a property, such that the resultant state of affairs exemplifies existence itself.

Now let us look at some interesting features or consequences of this general proposal. First, for it to work, we shall accept a radical form of mereological universalism. Universalists in terms of mereology are those who accept unrestricted composition: “For any things whatsoever, there is an object composed of these things”.¹⁴ Usually, “any things” ranges over existent objects, and the expression “there is” is taken as ontologically committing. In our case, we have to accept a larger domain of objects and refuse the identification of quantification and existence assignment. In other words, we have to accept what I call **Radical Unrestricted Composition**: for any object, existent or not, there is an object (existent or not) composed of these things.¹⁵

accept solidified lava as an indirect part of that state of affairs (and that would not force one to assume, *contra* Textor, that the state of affairs should inherit the properties of its indirect parts – for that is a different and unnecessary metaphysical assumption); (ii) one might put into question the unrestricted transitivity of *part-of*, something envisaged by philosophers such as Rescher (1955); or (iii) one might take the relation of instantiation as primitive and say simply that states of affairs are objects instantiating properties, ignoring the attempt of reducing states of affairs to mereological sums (which would not undermine the core of my proposal: true negative existentials would still have states of affairs as truthmakers, and these would be nonexistent objects instantiating the property of *being-nonexistent*).

¹³ Should we really say that these are two forms of mereological composition, or we are actually appealing to non-mereological composition again? I think that is an important disadvantage of this approach when compared with the Nuclear and Modal Meinongian strategies.

¹⁴ See Wallace (2023), p.2.

¹⁵ Radical Unrestricted Composition may seem like a new Comprehension Principle. Nevertheless, all objects derived by this principle were already admitted by neo-Meinongians. Take the case of Nuclear Meinongianism: every state of affairs and every mereological composition of particulars correspond to a set of nuclear properties, just like all other objects that can be derived by the Nuclear Meinongian Comprehension Principle. For instance,

The sum of any two existent particulars leads to an existent particular (the sum of Christ the Redeemer with The Colosseum leads to another existent particular), and that is something usual Universalists already accept. If you sum a nonexistent particular with any other particular, you end up with a nonexistent particular¹⁶ (the sum of Raskolnikov plus Lady Gaga is a nonexistent particular). The sum of an existent or nonexistent particular with a property leads to a state of affairs. Some states of affairs exist, others do not (you may also say that some states of affairs obtain, and others do not, but I am assuming particulars and states of affairs have the same mode of being, even if we express that with different terms).¹⁷

Interestingly, there is no principle telling us which states of affairs exist – we have to discover it empirically (and sometimes *a priori*). You may know that *The Eiffel Tower being in France* obtains because you visited Paris; you know *Sherlock Holmes non-existing* obtains because someone told you that Doyle's books on Holmes's adventures are fictional; you know *Obama having four arms* does not obtain (does not exist) because you saw him on TV many times and verified he has only two arms; I know *a priori* that *Mr. Schnukles having two thousand eyes* obtains because he is a fictional character I have just invented.

Besides that, with all these mereological fusions in the widest domain of quantification, you do not have to appeal to non-mereological sums to explain truthmaking, as Armstrong does, at least regarding the Nuclear and Modal Meinongian approaches I propose. Non-mereological sums are usually appealed to because you cannot always find, in the Quinean metaontological framework, the corresponding state of affairs for every possible mereological sum between a particular and a universal – as mentioned before, there is no *Eiffel Tower being made of chocolate* corresponding to the sum of the Eiffel Tower plus the property of *being-made-of-chocolate*. However, such a problem does not afflict Neo-Meinongians. All nonexistent states of affairs are part of the most general domain of quantification and, therefore, for every sum of objects plus properties, there will be a corresponding state of affairs (existent or not). Interestingly, this general suggestion leads to a sort of truth theory: a

Raskolnikov being nonexistent is an object (a state of affairs) corresponding to the set of nuclear properties {*being-a-state-of-affairs*; *having-Raskolnikov-as-a-part*; *having-nonexistence-as-a-part*}.

¹⁶ This thesis can actually be contested; I just cannot find any convincing counter-examples.

¹⁷ I am assuming a two-category ontology, distinguishing between particulars and properties. Particulars can be individuals or states of affairs. By the way of examples: a chair is an individual, *being-brown* is a property and *the chair being brown* is a state of affairs. *De Niro being an actor being a state of affairs* is a state of affairs composed of a particular state of affairs and a property.

true proposition would be true by virtue of the corresponding existent state of affairs, and a false proposition would be false due to the fact that its corresponding state of affairs is nonexistent.

According to the presented approach, Dual-Copula Meinongians would have the disadvantage of appealing to two new primitives, losing the benefits of rejecting non-mereological composition. Nevertheless, their theory also leads to a truth theory similar to the one compatible with the Nuclear and Modal approaches, that is: a true proposition would be true because its corresponding state of affairs exemplifies existence, and a false proposition would be false due to the fact that its corresponding state of affairs exemplifies nonexistence.

Notwithstanding, these Meinongian proposals lead to at least one odd and counterintuitive consequence: they must accept the existence of objects (states of affairs) with nonexistent mereological parts. How could this be the case? I think the most plausible answer to this problem is simply appealing to the fact that our intuition against this consequence comes from the fact that we cannot imagine an ordinary individual with a nonexistent part, and we ignore the fact that states of affairs can have a different metaphysical nature than ordinary individuals. If we try to think of a chair whose front legs are nonexistent, we will be actually thinking of a chair with no front legs (it would be absurd to say that the chair *does* have front legs, although they instantiate *nonexistence*). The wanna-be nonexistent parts of an individual are always (I presume) considered not to be parts of the object in real life.

However, it is not obvious why states of affairs could not have nonexistent parts. I do not think we have clear intuitions concerning the metaphysical nature of states of affairs such that saying they can have nonexistent parts would offend common sense. Take the example of *Pegasus being nonexistent*. If we agree that its supposed nonexistent part is actually a part it does not have, we will have to say that the existent state of affairs *Pegasus does not exist* does not have Pegasus itself as a part. But then, what is this state of affairs about? Anything you choose to be the *substratum* instantiating nonexistence would have to be nonexistent and, therefore, could not be part of anything (in particular, it could not be part of the state of affairs of it being nonexistent).

Therefore, we would have to end up saying that *Pegasus does not exist* is not a state of affairs (as traditional Quineans would say). Nonetheless, denying that it is a state of affairs seems a desperate move for a Meinongian (and we are assuming Meinongian metaontology

to be the right one here). Given that Meinongians accept that nonexistents can have properties, they would be inclined to say that Pegasus *does* have the property of nonexistence, and that would presumably lead directly to the obtainment of the state of affairs *Pegasus being nonexistent*.

In short, with no strong arguments against the possibility of states of affairs having nonexistent parts, I think assuming the truthmaking thesis I proposed is the best way for Meinongians to deal with the truthmaking problem for negative existentials: it provides the most straightforward answer to the truthmaking problem, it is not ideologically committed to non-mereological composition or ontologically committed to absences and it is a way more discriminating solution than appealing to the world itself as a truthmaker.

6. Final Remarks

Even if I think that my general proposal is the best solution to the problem, assuming Meinongian metaontology, someone can clearly use it as a *modus tollens* against the Meinongian metaontology itself:

P1. If the Meinongian metaontology is the right one, then the truthmakers for true negative existentials are states of affairs with a nonexistent part.

P2. The truthmakers for true negative existentials are not states of affairs with a nonexistent part (that is an absurd proposal!).

C1. The Meinongian metaontology is not the right one.

Rejecting this move requires arguing for the ideological superiority of Meinongianism as a metaontology, showing its theoretical advantages, and throwing light on the disadvantages of the Quinean metaontology. That, however, exceeds the objectives of this article, whose aim was simply to show a solution that already converted Meinongians can give to the Truthmaking Problem of Negative Existentials.

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Recebido em: 11/03/2025.

Aprovado em: 13/06/2025.

Publicado em: 31/07/2025